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A View on Venetian Apprenticeship
from the Garzoni Database
Giovanni Colavizza
(Digital Humanities Laboratory, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)
Abstract
A sample of contracts of apprenticeship from three periods in the history of early 
modern Venice is analysed, as recorded in the archive of the Giustizia Vecchia, a 
venetian magistracy. The periods are the end of the 16th century, the 1620s and 
the 1650s. A set of findings is discussed. First, the variety of professions repre-
sented in the dataset reduces over time, as the proportion of venetian apprentices 
increases, in accordance with previous literature highlighting the decline of the 
venetian economy during the 17th century. Secondly, apprenticeships are found to 
be divided into two broad groups: those who stipulated a payment to be given by 
the master to the apprentice (circa 80%), and those who did not. The first group is 
suggested to represent contracts used in part, sometimes exclusively, to hire cheap 
workforce as well as to provide training. Lastly, professional profiles are introduced, 
as a combination of statistics which provide evidence of three typologies of profes-
sions with respect to apprenticeship market dynamics.1
1. Introduction
In the context of the debate on guilds and their economic and 
social role, two quite opposite views have been proposed. S. R. 
Epstein casts a benign view on guilds, as essentially devoted to 
the transfer of skills through apprenticeship and to the guarantee 
of contracts for both parties involved.2 S. Ogilvie instead depicts 
guilds as closed groups of self-interested masters, whose aim was 
the endogenous redistribution of wealth. As such, guilds for the 
most part indulged in providing preferential access to relatives, ne-
glecting open access to training for outsiders, essentially disregard-
1. This paper is a preliminary result of the Garzoni (GAWS) project, which will 
extensively study venetian apprenticeship in the coming years. See http://irhis.
hypotheses.org/12296 and http://garzoni.hypotheses.org/.
2. Stephen R. Epstein, «Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in 
Preindustrial Europe», The Journal of Economic History, 1998, 58 (3), p. 684.
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ing their alleged social role as providers of skill transmission and 
security for young people.3 Both authors at least agree on the need 
for further quantitative and regional investigations as a means to 
inform this currently polarized debate.4
The last take on Venice in this respect is that of MacKenney, who 
suggested that in the city of Saint Mark, «[...] an apprenticeship 
maintained the traditional standards of production of the trade and 
protected a considerable number of young people from poverty».5 
At the same time, «there is no evidence that the family operated as a 
power base for its members within the corporation» except for some 
specific guilds, and only during the 18th century.6 
The lively debate on guilds therefore cannot but be informed by 
a more thorough and comparative view on apprenticeship, an in-
stitution of crucial importance within the mechanics of society for 
reasons of welfare, labour, transmission of skills and knowledge, and 
more general economic dynamics. Yet apprenticeship is also a gate-
way for several other enquiries spanning from social and gender 
history to the history of art.
Venetian apprenticeship has never been systematically studied.7 It 
is the purpose of the GAWS project to amend this gap in our knowl-
edge, by the creation and systematic study of a series of contracts of 
apprenticeship for several crafts, registered in documentation cur-
rently held at the State Archive of Venice.
3. Sheilagh Ogilvie, «The Economics of Guilds», The Journal of Economic Perspecti-
ves, 2014, 28 (4), p. 181-183.
4. Stephen R. Epstein, «Craft guilds in the pre-modern economy: a discussion», 
Economic History Review, 2008, 61 (1), p. 155 and Sheilagh Ogilvie, «Rehabilita-
ting the guilds: a reply», Economic History Review, 2008, 61 (1), p. 181.
5. Richard MacKenney, «The Guilds of Venice: State and Society in the Longue 
Duree», Studi Veneziani, 1997, XXXIV, p. 39.
6. Ivi, p. 41-42.
7. Anna Bellavitis, «Apprentissages masculins, apprentissages féminins à Venise au 
XVIe siècle», Histoire urbaine, 2006, 15 (1), p. 49-73.
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The goal of this paper is to present an analysis of a sample of 
contracts from different periods in venetian history, with the aim of 
sketching a first view of the apprenticeship in Venice from a strict-
ly macroscopic perspective, something rarely attempted before in 
the context of the history of the Republic. Some questions to pose 
and address include: which were the basic feats of venetian appren-
ticeships, and how do they compare to other examples in Europe? 
Can apprenticeship contracts provide some cues of the state of the 
venetian economy in general? Do such cues accord with previous 
literature or not? What was the use of the apprenticeship as an eco-
nomic relation, and how did it develop over time? Were apprentices 
in Venice viewed as a cheap source of generic labour, or were they 
effectively trained to become journeymen, masters and members of 
a guild, thus providing a relevant social role such is that of skill and 
knowledge transmission?
Venice seems to differ from other well-known examples (e.g. En-
gland), as the apprenticeship appears to be a bi-faceted instrument 
used both as a source of labour and as a gateway to entry in a pro-
fession, with characteristic traits for each profession persisting over 
time in this regard. The future study of such tension, and its relative 
stability through time, could provide in due course an important 
contribution to the debate on guilds and the economics of knowl-
edge in early modern Europe. Some of these insights are anticipated 
in what follows.
After a brief description of the evidence used and its acquisi-
tion into a database, a section of descriptive statistics highlights 
the essential traits of venetian contracts of apprenticeship. Next, 
a closer look at salaries and their components allows to delve into 
some fundamentals of venetian apprenticeship over the periods 
under consideration. The notion of professional profiles is finally 
introduced, in order to understand how apprenticeships were used 
in different crafts.
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2. Data Acquisition
The documentary series of the Accordi dei Garzoni is the product 
of the systematic registration of contracts of apprenticeship at the 
Giustizia Vecchia, a venetian magistracy. The Giustizia Vecchia was 
in charge for registering apprenticeship contracts from most of the 
regulated professions in Venice, with some notable exceptions (e.g. 
silk workers). Regulation enforcing the registration of contracts was 
put in place during the 13th and 14th centuries, in order to provide 
a guarantee for both parties involved, especially apprentices. The 
outcome is a dense series of contracts, surviving for the best part 
integrally from the year 1575 until 1772.8
The typical contract of apprenticeship registers the following 
components: the mentions of the apprentice (always one per 
contract), the master (rarely more than one) and the guarantor 
(sometimes absent, sometimes more than one) in terms of a vari-
able set of information, comprising name, surname, patronymic, 
profession, gender, etc. Two fields are specified almost exclusively 
for apprentices: age and geographical origins. The last two com-
ponents are the financial and temporal details of the contract: 
the payment (if due, usually by the master) and other agreements 
(such as who provided for clothing, accommodation, etc. for the 
apprentice), the length of the contract, and whether the contract 
was interrupted in advance (e.g. due to the premature departure 
of the apprentice).
The pre-study phase for the Garzoni project spanned the whole 
year 2014. Its aim was to populate the database with a set of sam-
ples of contracts from different periods, considering all contracts 
from a subset of the professions recorded by Giustizia Vecchia.9 
8. For more details see Vittorio Lazzarini, «Antichi ordinamenti veneziani a tutela 
del lavoro dei garzoni», in Atti del regio Istituto Veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 1929, 
LXXXVIII (II), p. 61-75 and Bellavitis, «Apprentissages masculins, apprentissages 
féminins», cit.
9. The full list of the 204 professions and specializations considered for the pre-stu-
dy is available upon request. The selection has been made by considering or exclu-
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A data-entry interface has been developed using an instance of a 
Semantic Media Wiki, which allows fast deployment speed at the 
price of customizability.10 A total of 11563 contracts have been re-
corded into the database, all sampled form State Archive of Venice, 
Giustizia Vecchia, Accordi dei Garzoni, registers 151 to 177. Of these 
contracts, a final subset of 3687 double-blind-checked contracts is 
retained for the present study: the full contents of registers 152, 
153, 157, 158, 163, 164, 169, 170, for the selected crafts.
Due to the goals of the pre-study, which were exploratory, con-
tracts pertain to different sample periods, as can be seen from Figure 
1. This sample can be considered to be representative of three im-
portant periods in venetian history: 1549 contracts from the late 
16th century (before 1600 and after the plague of the year 1576), 
982 contracts from the 20s of the 17th century (before the plague 
of the years 1630-31), and 1156 contracts from the middle years of 
the War of Candia (1650 to 1660).
ding entire activity sectors, for example all professions within or related to the 
‘book industry’ are included, and all professions in the textile sector are excluded.
10. http://semantic-mediawiki.org/.
 3 
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Figure'1:'Number'of'contracts'per'year,'and'proportion'of'contracts'with'a'payment'given'by'the'master'to'the'apprentice.'
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
A first overview of the dataset must start from the distributions of professions, in order to 
understand the variety of venetian economic activities. The sample presents 178 unique 
professio s, several being compo itions of specializations ( uch as “Stampador, Compon r” or 
“Far manacordi, Suonador di manacordi”). The first 20 professions by number of contracts 
cover roughly 81% of the total contracts, producing a fat tail in the distribution and highlighting 
a variety of activities, as shown in Figure 2. The three sample periods, taken individually, offer 
some insights into the dynamics of venetian economy, as per Figure 3 and Figure 4. The trend 
presents a reduction in the number of represented professions (111 for period 1, 94 for period 
2 and 75 for period 3) and a reduction in size of the right tail of the resulting distributions (if 
we need 20 professions to gather 80% of registered apprenticeship contracts during period 1, 
we need 16 and 14 during periods 2 and 3 respectively). Essentially, the same number of 
                                                
3 The full list of the 204 professions and specializations considered for the pre-study is available upon request. 
The selection has been made by considering or excluding entire activity sectors, for example all professions within 
or related to the ‘book industry’ are included, and all professions in the textile sector are excluded. 
4 http://semantic-mediawiki.org/.  
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Fig. 1. Number of contracts per year, and proportion of contracts with a payment 
given by the master to the apprentice.
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3. Descriptive Statistics
A first overview of the dataset must start from the distributions of 
professions, in order to understand the variety of venetian econom-
ic activities. The sample presents 178 unique professions, several 
being compositions of specializations (such as “Stampador, Com-
poner” or “Far manacordi, Suonador di manacordi”). The first 20 
professions by number of contracts cover roughly 81% of the total 
contracts, producing a fat tail in the distribution and highlighting a 
variety of activities, as shown in Figure 2. The three sample periods, 
taken individually, offer some insights into the dynamics of vene-
tian economy, as per Figure 3 and Figure 4. The trend presents a 
reduction in the number of represented professions (111 for period 
1, 94 for period 2 and 75 for period 3) and a reduction in size of the 
right tail of the resulting distributions (if we need 20 professions to 
gather 80% of registered apprenticeship contracts during period 1, 
we need 16 and 14 during periods 2 and 3 respectively). Essentially, 
the same number of apprentices were directed towards fewer profes-
sions in variety, and at the same time fewer professions were getting 
the lion’s share of fresh recruits.
It is also worth noting that the economy appears to become in-
creasingly specialized towards specific luxury areas (mirrors, gold 
products), whilst the relative reduction in importance of some 
general activities (carpenters, general retail sellers) over period 3 
might also be caused by the lasting effects of the plague. Some 
well-known trends in venetian economy are confirmed by ap-
prenticeships too, such as the virtual disappearance of the press 
industry during the 17th century.11 To be sure, these preliminary 
considerations will be re-examined in light of the integration of 
all professions into the database and an extensive survey of other 
sources.
11. Mario Infelise, «La crise de la librairie vénitienne, 1620-1650», in Barbier, 
Frédéric et al. (eds.), Le livre et l’historien: études offertes en l’honneur du professeur 
Henri Jean-Martin, Geneva, Droz, 1997, p. 343-352.
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apprentices were directed towards fewer professions in variety, and at the same time fewer 
professions were getting the lion’s share of fresh recruits. 
It is also worth noting that the economy appears to become increasingly specialized towards 
specific luxury areas (mirrors, gold products), whilst the relative reduction in importance of 
some general activities (carpenters, general retail sellers) over period 3 might also be caused 
by the lasting effects of the plague. Some well-known trends in venetian economy find some 
evidence in apprenticeships too, such as the virtual disappearance of the press industry during 
the XVII century (Infelise 1997). To be sure, these preliminary considerations must be re-
examined in light of the integration of all professions into the database and an extensive survey 
of other sources. 
 
 
Figure'2:'Number'of'contracts'for'the'20'most'represented'professions'over'the'whole'sample.'
 
 
Figure'3:'Number'of'contracts'for'the'10'most'represented'professions'over'the'three'sample'periods.!
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apprentices were directed towards fewer professions in variety, and at the same time fewer 
professions were getting the lion’s share of fresh recruits. 
It is also worth noting that the economy appears to become increasingly specialized towards 
specific luxury areas (mirrors, gold products), whilst the relative reduction in importance of 
some general activities (carpenters, general retail sellers) over period 3 might also be caused 
by the lasting effects of the plague. Some well-known trends in venetian economy find some 
evidence in apprenticeships too, such as the virtual disappearance of the press industry during 
the XVII century (Infelise 1997). To be sure, these preliminary considerations must be re-
examined in light of the integration of all professions into the database and an extensive survey 
of other sources. 
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Figure 2. Number of contracts for the 20 most represented professions 
ov r the whole sample.
Figure 3. Number of contracts for the 10 most represented professions
over the three sample eriods.
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Another perspective is given by a first sample of summary statis-
tics, to be compared over time, in Table 1.
Statistic Overall Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Average age of apprentices 
(below 25 y.o.) 14.3 14.25 14.4 14.31
Average length of contracts 
(in years) 5.09 5.15 5.15 4.96
Average end of the contract 
age (below 25 y.o.) 19.46 19.43 19.57 19.39
Average annual salaries  
(in venetian ducats) 5.7 5.4 5.2 6.6
Known orphans by father 
among apprentices 36% 39% 38% 32%
Apprentices declared  
as fled 11% 15% 10% 5.8%
Venetian apprentices loose 
(see note 14) 44% 34% 46% 56%
Venetian apprentices strict 
(see note 14) 11% 8.5% 4% 22%
Contracts with a payment by 
the master 79% 82% 75% 79%
 5 
 
Figure'4:'Number'of'contracts'for'all'professions'over'the'three'sample'periods.'Note'the'reduction'of'the'distribution'tail'
over'periods,'in'terms'of'both'its'length'(variety'of'professions)'and'‘fatness’'(concentration'of'professions).!
 
Another perspective is given by a first sample of summary statistics, to be compared over time, 
in Table 1. 
 
Table'1:'Summa y'statistics'overall'and'for'the'three'sample'periods.'Y.'o.'stands'for'years'old.'
Statistic Overall Period1 Period2 Period3 
Average age of apprentices (below 25 y.o.) 14.3 14.25 14.4 14.31 
Average length of contracts (in years) 5.09 5.15 5.15 4.96 
Average end of the contract age (below 25 y.o.) 19.46 19.43 19.57 19.39 
Average annual salaries (in venetian ducats) 5.7 5.4 5.2 6.6 
Known orphans by father among apprentices 36% 39% 38% 32% 
Apprentices declared as fled 11% 15% 10% 5.8% 
Venetian apprentices loose (see note 7) 44% 34% 46% 56% 
Venetian apprentices strict (see note 7) 11% 8.5% 4% 22% 
Contracts with a payment by the master 79% 82% 75% 79% 
 
The average age of apprentices, calculated removing a small number of particularly old 
outliers5, is substantially stable over time at just above 14 years. This element, as well as the 
average length of contracts and age of apprentices at the end of their contract has been 
previously analysed (Bellavitis 2006, p. 56). 
The last statistic in Table 1 is possibly the most important one: overall 8 out of 10 contracts of 
apprenticeship stipulated that the master was supposed to give a payment to the apprentice, for 
the most part to be paid in a single instalment probably at the end of the contract, and in venetian 
ducats (with a negligible amount of exceptions). We see here a first bifurcation, which will be 
further explored in what follows, between apprentices that were paid, and apprentices that 
worked for free or were paying their master in turn. 
                                                
5 A marginal phenomenon, further illustrated in Lazzarini (1929, p. 64). The mean statistic is calculated only 
considering apprentices below 25 years old at the beginning of their contract. 
Period 1
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
0%
25
%
50
%
75
%
10
0%
Period 2
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
0%
25
%
50
%
75
%
10
0%
Period 3
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
0%
25
%
50
%
75
%
10
0%
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 P
er
ce
nta
ge
Table 1. Summary statistics ov rall and for the three sample periods,
y.o. stands for years old. 
Figure 4. Number of contracts for all professions over the three sample periods. Note 
the reduction of the distribution tail over periods, in terms of both its length (variety 
of professions) and ‘fatness’ (concentration of contracts into few professions).
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The average age of apprentices, calculated removing a small num-
ber of particularly old outliers,12 is substantially stable over time 
at just above 14 years. This element, as well as the average length 
of contracts and age of apprentices at the end of their contract has 
been previously analysed.13
The last statistic in Table 1 is possibly the most important one: 
overall 8 out of 10 contracts of apprenticeship stipulated that the 
master was supposed to give a payment to the apprentice, for the 
most part to be paid in a single instalment probably at the end of 
the contract, and in venetian ducats (with a negligible amount of 
exceptions). We see here a first bifurcation, which will be further 
explored in what follows, between apprentices that were paid, and 
apprentices that worked for free or were paying their master in turn.
Another element to note is that the proportion of apprentices14 
from Venice consistently rose over time, and to the opposite the 
proportion of apprentices declared as fled during their contract 
lowers. The reduction in professional variety, as well as the rise of 
the venetian component among apprentices, might both be con-
sistent with previous work remarking how the venetian economy 
became increasingly introvert during the 17th century.15
Apprenticeships were, for the most part, successfully brought to 
an end. Only circa 11% of apprentices was denounced as fled before 
the contract was over; a proportion that, even if added to a lower but 
12. A marginal phenomenon, further illustrated in Lazzarini, «Antichi ordinamenti 
veneziani a tutela del lavoro dei garzoni», cit., p. 64. The mean statistic is calculated 
only considering apprentices below 25 years old at the beginning of their contract.
13. Bellavitis, «Apprentissages masculins, apprentissages féminins», cit., p. 56.
14. Venetian apprentices strict only considers apprentices explicitly mentioned as 
venetian, whilst loose also considers as venetians all apprentices for which the geo-
graphical origins are not specified, as previously suggested by Bellavitis, «Appren-
tissages masculins, apprentissages féminins», cit., e.g. p. 61. In the discussion, the 
loose version is considered as it seems by far the most reasonable.
15. Paola Lanaro, «Corporations et confréries : les étrangers et la marché du travail 
à Venise (XVe-XVIIIe siècles)», Histoire urbaine, 2008, 21 (1), p. 32.
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similar proportion of contracts ended by mutual agreement,16 is quite 
low compared to other European settings. Venetians were less likely 
to flee, maybe being more guaranteed and well treated by their mas-
ters, and with more vested interest for integration into the city life.
It is also worth mentioning that 2 out of 5 apprentices were or-
phans by father, a strong hint at the social role of apprenticeships as 
a safety net for young children.17
Lastly, in the corpus there are at the moment only 4 female ap-
prentices, but 32 female masters and 192 contracts with at least one 
woman as guarantor. Indeed, the Garzoni database will allow to 
study the professional activity of women in some detail, yet here the 
reduced sample and the fact that the sectors deemed traditionally 
most important for women (notably, textile) are for now missing, 
prevent further analysis.
To summarize it can then be argued, albeit from preliminary evi-
dence, that the venetian apprenticeship market became gradually 
more introvert over time, with a rising component of venetians by 
origin, who brought more stability (fewer early interruptions), wi-
thout substantial modifications into other statistics such as age and 
length of contract. The apprenticeship market therefore seems to 
confirm the increasingly more introvert tendency of the economy 
of Venice during the 17th century, either directly or via changes in 
guild regulation or their record-keeping practices. We now take a 
closer look at wages, the payments given by masters to apprentices.
4. A Preliminary Analysis on the Determinants of Payments to 
Apprentices
Wages are crucial in our understanding of apprenticeship as an 
economic institution: were apprentices a source of cheap and ge-
neric labour or were they getting training, or a bit of both? What 
16. MacKenney, «The Guilds of Venice: State and Society in the Longue Duree», 
cit., p. 37-38.
17. Ivi, p. 39.
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elements in the contracts concur to determine the payments given 
to apprentices? How do they change over time?
The overall trend of wages18 paid by the masters in Figure 5, 
confirms a previously found general rise of the value of labour 
following the plague of the 1630-31,19 and also in the years of 
the War of Candia. Yet the question to be asked here is: who was 
paying whom and why?
The proportion of contracts with some kind of payment in mon-
ey given by the master to the apprentice, is substantially equal across 
sample periods (Figure 1). Only a minor 4% of contracts entailed 
a payment given instead from someone (apprentice or guarantor) 
18. In the absence of further specifications, I will from now on refer to wages as the 
share of payments given by the master to the apprentice in money, using whatever 
periodization.
19. Luciano Pezzolo, Il fisco dei veneziani, Verona, Cierre, 2003, p. 198.
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Variable (1/0) Accommodation by 
master 
Personal care by 
master 
Clothes by master Generic expenses 
by master 
Accommodation by 
master 
1 0.872 0.226 0.926 
Personal care by 
master 
0.87 1 0.179 0.826 
Clothes by master 0.226 0.179 1 0.195 
Generic expenses 
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7 In the absence of further specifications, I will from now on refer to salaries as the share of salaries paid by the 
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Figure 5. Overall trends of average annual payments (in venetian ducats) 
given by masters to apprentices. 
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to the master. The rest, 17% of contracts, had no specification of a 
payment in money (Table 2). Similarly, the proportion of wages to 
be paid in one instalment over wages paid at regular intervals is very 
high and stable over time (average of 87%). Furthermore, of these, 
almost all wages were paid annually (11.5%, Tables 3 and 4).
Other factors related to these compensations, and possibly im-
pacting them are the contractual conditions related to the lodging, 
providing personal care, clothes and expenses of the apprentices. 
Table 5 presents the highly positive correlations that can be found 
when some components of the contracts are considered. As it can 
be seen, 3 out of 4 components are part of the provisions of the 
master to the apprentice, whilst for the most part it was on the ap-
prentice to provide for his/her clothes. In summary, not only most 
of the contracts provided a payment in a final instalment to the 
apprentice, but also demanded to the master to provide for lodging, 
personal care and generic expenses.
Variable  
(1/0)
Accommo-
dation by 
master
Personal care 
by master
Clothes
by master
Generic ex-
penses
by master
Accommoda-
tion
by master
1 0.872 0.226 0.926
Personal care 
by master 0.87 1 0.179 0.826
Clothes 
by master 0.226 0.179 1 0.195
Generic ex-
penses
by master
0.926 0.826 0.195 1
Table 2. Correlation matrix of some components of the contracts  
(all reported statistics have a p-value at 0.01 significance, only contracts  
with a payment given by the master are considered).
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The working hypothesis of this section is the following one: 
apprenticeships broadly belonged to two groups. On the one hand, 
most contracts, especially the ones with a payment given annually, 
and possibly also those paid in a final instalment, are primarily, 
even if not exclusively, labour contracts.20 Another group is that of 
apprenticeships who were not paid or were supposed to pay their 
master in turn, who might be considered as contracts for apprentices 
mostly getting trained and possibly a preferential access to the 
craft. To be sure, a mixed view is the most reasonable:21 apprentices 
pertaining to both groups were likely receiving some training and 
were also performing some generic work, the difference is not to be 
intended as one of absolute, but relative degree.
Statistic Overall Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Paid by master 79% 82% 75% 79%
Paid by someone else to the master 4% 3.2% 5% 4%
No payment in money 17% 14.8% 20% 17%
Totals 100%(3687)
42%
(1549)
26.5%
(982)
31.5%
(1156)
20. A possible practice already highlighted in Manuela Martini, Anna Bellavitis, 
«Households economies, social norms and practices of unpaid market work in 
Europe from the sixteenth century to the present», The History of the Family, 2014, 
19 (3), p. 276.
21. Close to what has been proposed by P. Wallis for London (Patrick Wallis, «Appren-
ticeship and Training in Premodern England», Journal of Economic History, 2007, 68 
(3), p. 7 and 24): a mixed model accounting for work and training in parallel, in order 
to minimize the risk for both parties involved, in the absence of extra-market contract 
enforcement. The venetian case is quite different at its core, especially since the high 
retention rate and incentives given to apprentices in the form of a payment, as well 
as a probably higher state enforcement, do not justify the need for a strictly parallel 
mode of apprenticeship. My remark here is of simple common sense: apprentices were 
likely to do a lot of things at the same time, but still two broad groups of contracts, 
one oriented towards labour and the other towards training are justifiable by evidence.
Table 3. Who gets a payment and who pays for it.
248
Garzoni.  
Apprendistato e formazione tra Venezia e l’Europa in età moderna
Statistic Overall Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Payments given at the end of the contract 86.7% 87% 84% 88%
Corresponding average annual payment 5 4.4 4.9 6
Payments given annually 11.5% 9.5% 15.7% 11%
Corresponding average annual payment 9.4 10.5 6.6 11.1
Incremental payments given annually 4.8% 6.1% 3.4% 4.1%
Corresponding average annual payment 10.9 10.5 6.9 14.4
Totals 100%(2908)
43%
(1266)
25%
(733)
31%
(909)
Average wages paid annually, especially so if incrementally, are 
considerably higher than those paid on one instalment, providing 
more evidence for the added value of apprentices to their masters. 
We are left wondering what kind of so valuable training they were 
getting to require such incentives to stay into apprenticeship: a 
future enquiry on these contracts, and the professions where they 
were most in use, might provide further cues.
In order to verify the given hypothesis, it is worth considering 
the positioning of venetians into the individuated remuneration 
groups. As can be seen from Table 5, a considerable and rising pro-
portion of apprentices without a given payment were venetians, 
more than the relative proportion of venetians overall. For example, 
if 17% of contracts overall were without payment, 10.6% of these 
were venetians (thus the 62.35%, albeit overall venetians were just 
the 44% of the total apprentices). It can therefore be concluded that 
venetians had a preference for contracts of group 2, likely to lead 
to more rapid training and professional advancement, which seems 
reasonable.
Table 4. Periodization analysis for payments by masters to apprentices.
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Statistic Overall Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Venetians with 
single-instal-
ment payment
27% 21% 26% 35.5%
Corresponding 
average payment 5.4 4.4 5.2 6.4
Venetians with 
annual-instal-
ment payment
5.9% 4.4% 7.9% 6.2%
Corresponding 
average payment 8.9 10 5.9 11
Venetians with 
incremental 
payment
2.4% 2.8% 1.6% 2.3%
Corresponding 
average payment 9.6 8.3 6 13.9
Venetians with 
no payment 
from master
10.6% 7.5% 11.6% 13.8%
Venetians 
overall
44% 
(1630/3687)
34% 
(536/1549)
45.6% 
(448/982)
56% 
(648/1156)
A final regression analysis is useful in providing insights on the 
factors most relevant to determine wages, also over time. A set of 
variables are taken as independent and regressed against the average 
annual payment (see Appendix for results).
The positive strong correlation of the age of the apprentice on its 
payment is another indicator of apprentices being used as generic 
labour force. It is important to consider this evidence in comparison 
with the estimate of apprentices who switched masters. More than 
97% of apprentices never had more than one master in our dataset: 
the practice of swapping masters and/or professions was apparently 
not common, at least for what we know now.22 Therefore, the pre-
22. These results rely on record linkage, which is the process of solving multiple 
references to the same person, as for example the same master being mentioned in 
Table 5. Venetians and their remuneration groups.
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mium of age on payment can hardly be considered as entailing pre-
viously developed skills in the same craft, but as a natural increase in 
the physical fitness of apprentices as generic providers of labour in 
the workshop. To be sure, in specific cases, previous undocumented 
experience into the craft, as well as a personal relationship between 
the master and the family of the apprentice might also explain this 
phenomenon, as discussed by Andrea Caracausi.23
We should turn for comparison to what has been shown for Lon-
don, where rising premiums paid to masters were linked with young-
er apprentices, deemed less productive,24 and lower premiums were 
due by apprentices with previous «exposure to the occupation».25 
Indeed, a «London apprenticeship was costly, long, and unstable. 
Youths entered much longer terms of service than their peers on the 
continent». These traits were substantiated by a minimum length of 
7 years, the practice of paying the master to enter apprenticeship, 
and the high likelihood of interruption before completion.26
In Venice, on the contrary, contracts were shorter, apprentices 
younger and for the most part receiving a payment, contracts were 
quite stable. Wages paid by masters generally increased if the appren-
tice was older at the beginning of a contract, even without previous 
known experience in the craft. Other notable elements, which con-
several contracts. Work on record linkage for the Garzoni database is still ongoing, 
see G. Colavizza, M. Ehrmann, Y. Rochat, A Method for Record Linkage with Sparse 
Historical Data, Digital Humanities Conference, 2016. 
23. Andrea Caracausi, «The price of an apprentice: contracts and trials in the wool-
len industry in sixteenth century Italy», Mélanges de l’École française de Rome - Italie 
et Méditerranée modernes et contemporaines [En ligne], 2016, 128-1. URL: http://
mefrim.revues.org/2476.
24. Patrick Wallis, Cliff Webb, Chris Minns, «Leaving Home and Entering Servi-
ce: The Age of Apprenticeship in Early Modern London», Continuity and Change, 
2010, 25 (3), p. 400.
25. Chris Minns, Patrick Wallis, «The price of human capital in a pre-industrial 
economy: Premiums and apprenticeship contracts in 18th century England», 
Explorations in Economic History, 2013, 50, p. 347.
26. Chris Minns, Patrick Wallis, «Rules and reality: quantifying the practice of appren-
ticeship in early modern England», Economic History Review, 2012, 65 (2), p. 792.
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firm the working hypothesis, are a negative correlation of payments 
with the length of contracts (shorter contracts entailed higher pay-
ments) and, as previously noted, the positive impact of incremental 
wages and the negative impact of a single, end-of-contract payment 
agreement in this respect.
In summary, several findings confirm a preliminary hypothesis 
which states that venetian contracts of apprenticeship were used for 
two distinct purposes in varying degrees: to hire generic workforce 
and as a means to provide professional training to apprentices. Con-
tracts in one group were numerically more consistent (about 80%), 
entailed a payment paid by the master to the apprentice either as a 
final payment or in regular instalments, as well as further securities, 
and also show a payment bonus paid to previously untrained but 
older apprentices. As a consequence, early contract interruptions 
were low, and swaps of masters or profession very rare. On the other 
hand, a group of contracts with no payment, or a compensation to 
be paid to the master, but a proportionally higher presence of vene-
tians was likely to provide for more systematic training to youths. 
This is for example the case of Pietro Mistan, enrolling in April 1622 
to become an apothecary, and willing to pay decreasing amounts of 
money every year to his master Giacomo Picini, as he was supposed 
to improve, and thus become more of use to his master over time. 
His first year was to be devoted to «andar il prima anno a scola a im-
parar litera».27 Similarly, the few contracts with a payment not paid 
by the master (thus paid by the apprentice, his relatives or some 
third party; 3% in our sample), considerably higher than average, 
are concentrated for the most part in some specific professions (3 
out of 4 are ‘merzeri’, ‘oresi’ or ‘tiraoro’) and clearly point to possible 
individual paths of integration into the profession. Such outliers, 
whose presence is well known, await systematic study.28 
27. «Go to school to learn how to read and write during the first year [of apprenti-
ceship]». ASVe, Giustizia Vecchia, Accordi dei Garzoni, b. 118, r. 163, c. 96v.
28. Anna Bellavitis, «Gender and Apprenticeship in Early Modern Western Eu-
rope: some considerations», in G. Jacobsen, H. Wunder (eds.), East meets West: 
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It has been suggested that, during the 18th century, printers and 
maybe other guilds or individuals used apprenticeships as sources of 
labour in order to overcome periods of crisis and find new margins of 
competitiveness in a now wider world.29 Such practice, that has been 
considered as a late development of a restructuring venetian econo-
my, or an expedient proper just to some sectors, might instead have 
been a constituent component of venetian apprenticeships, in a sort 
of duality giving flexibility and stability to the institution as a whole.
5. Investigating the Market of Apprentices: Professional Profiles
It is now time to bring back professions into the equation, in order 
to further characterize the large share of contracts with a payment 
paid by the master to the apprentice, which are considered to some 
extent contracts to hire young labour force. Professions can be divid-
ed in at least three distinct profiles according to the distributions of 
three statistics: the age at enrolment, the average annual payment, 
and the length of contracts. This reduced number of profiles is a pos-
sible systematic pattern into the well-known great variety of factors 
which affected the remuneration of apprentices and masters alike.30 
The overall average age at enrolment is found to be at 14.5 years; the 
average length of contracts is 5.08 years; and the average annual pay-
ment given by masters (calculated excluding 49 outliers with an annual 
payment above 30 ducats) is 5.09 ducats (over 2994 contracts).
These averages are rarely to be found in any profession, but instead 
aggregate quite different distributions. There are three professional 
profiles which can be identified in the dataset:
a gendered view of legal tradition, Conference of the International Research Network 
“Gender differences in the history of European legal cultures”, Budapest, 10-12 March 
2011, Kiel, Solivagus-Verlag, 2014, p. 212-213.
29. «[..] la riduzione dei lavoranti e garzoni a forza lavoro con scarse prospettive di 
promozione permisero alla stampa e all’editoria veneziane di vivere una favorevole 
stagione tra Sei e Settencento, pur nel quadro di un sistema corporativo formal-
mente rigido». Pezzolo, Il fisco dei veneziani, cit. p. 177.
30. Martini, Bellavitis, «Households economies, social norms and practices of unpaid 
market work in Europe from the sixteenth century to the present», cit., p. 276.
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Profile 1: lower than average age at enrolment, lower than average 
payment and longer than average length of contracts. Examples 
are typesetters in Figure 6, goldsmiths in Figure 7 and carpenters 
in Figure 8.
Profile 2: higher than average age at enrolment, higher payment and 
shorter contracts. Examples are the apprentices at the press in Fig-
ure 6, and mirror makers in Figure 7.
Profile 3: lastly, young apprentices with long contracts, but a higher 
than average payment, as is the case for stonecutters in Figure 8.
Profiles are listed in order of estimated frequency. It must be no-
ted that profiles can be considered only for professions with a rea-
sonable number of contracts in the dataset, and are also not useful 
for professions with a very low number of contracts with a payment 
paid by the master. The example of ‘pictori’ (painters) is remarkable, 
in that a limited but stable number of apprentices over time (49 
in total) are rarely paid by their masters to undergo their training; 
sometimes, instead, masters are to be paid in turn. Such professions 
or isolated cases clearly demand dedicated study.
 11 
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Fig. 6. Professional profiles of printers at the press (either press or inker, below) and 
typesetters (above). In red the overall mean for each statistic over the whole corpus.
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Fig. 7. Professional profiles of goldsmiths (above) and mirror makers (below). In red 
the overall mean for each statistic over the whole corpus.
 12 
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Figure'7:'Professional'profiles'of'goldsmiths'(above)'and'mirror'makers'(below).'In'red'the'overall'mean'for'each'statistic'
over'the'whole'corpus.'
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A further remarkable trait of professional profiles is their stability 
over time. Figures 9 and 10 show profiles for carpenters and mirror 
makers respectively, over the three sample periods under consider-
ation. Profiles do not fundamentally change in the peaks of their 
distribution, albeit they change in variance: carpenters tend to show 
a slight switch from profile 1 to profile 2 during periods 2 and 3, 
mirror makers stabilize in a weak form of profile 2.
Profiles help reduce the number of variables which character-
ize apprentices for different professions, and at the same time 
rise new questions on the inner workings of apprenticeships for 
different professions, as market dynamics come back into the 
picture. Profiles of type 1 indicate professions with a preference 
for young and cheap apprentices, who could work for longer. 
Profile 2 groups professions with a need for older apprentices, 
Fig. 9. Professional profiles of carpenters over the three periods. In red the overall 
mean for each statistic over the whole corpus.
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Figure'9:'Professional'profiles'of'carpenters'over'the'three'periods.'In'red'the'overall'mean'for'each'statistic'over'the'whole'
corpus.'
 
 
Figure'10:'Professional'profiles'of'mirror'makers'over'the'three'periods.'In'red'the'overall'mean'for'each'statistic'over'the'
whole'corpus.'
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longer. Profile 2 groups professions with a need for older apprentices, who had to be paid 
accordingly. Lastly, profile 3 might gather apprentices to professions with a preference for 
early hiring, but for particularly demanding works, which meant a premium on salaries had to 
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who had to be paid more accordingly. Lastly, profile 3 might 
gather apprentices to professions with a preference for early hir-
ing, but for particularly demanding works, which meant extra 
compensation had to be provided for (yet not always, such in the 
case of stonecutters). Professional profiles seem to be explained by 
market dynamics and the specific needs of different crafts. They also 
might confirm how, despite the general hypothesis of apprentices as 
being a source of cheap labour more than youths to be trained, dif-
ferent professions entailed varied, more or less demanding tasks from 
their recruits.
Venetian apprenticeships were used by contemporaries in dif-
ferent ways, and were also subject to market dynamics. Different 
professions had different needs from their apprentices, which were 
accommodated at least in part by the market, and resulted in char-
acteristic professional profiles with strong stability over time.
Fig. 10. Professional profiles of mirror makers over the three periods. In red the 
overall mean for each statistic over the whole corpus.
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6. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents a first framing of venetian apprenticeship. First, 
contracts of apprenticeships are shown to be a partial proxy for the 
dynamics of the venetian economy, as they too highlight its tendency 
for introversion over the 17th century. Apprenticeship wages are then 
analysed, evidencing a possible duality in degree between contracts 
with and without a payment being given to the apprentice by the 
master. Evidence supports the claim that the first group of contracts 
was also used to hire cheap workforce receiving reduced training or 
fewer chances to join the craft, whilst the second group instead is 
composed of apprentices receiving more systematic training. Lastly, 
professional profiles are introduced, as a means to further explore 
market dynamics for apprenticeships in different professions.
One remarkable limitation of the present work is the virtual ab-
sence of apprentices’ geographical origins into the account, except 
for venetians and the rest. The preliminary stage of the project dis-
allowed the use of this yet to normalize information. It will be, of 
course, of the outmost importance into a future investigation, and 
might further specify the mechanics of professional profiles along-
side trends already discussed here. Another important subject bare-
ly touched upon here is gender. There are several cases of females 
among apprentices, masters and even more guarantors, even not 
having yet considered traditional female sectors of activity (e.g. the 
textile sector wasn’t included in the pre-study). Lastly, but not ex-
clusively, social professional and family networks resulting from this 
specific view on the society of Venice that contacts of apprentice-
ship provide, should yield further insights into the inner workings 
of venetian apprenticeships.
A proper investigation of the nature of apprentices will therefore 
require further work, yet it seems the complexity of the picture can 
hardly be oversimplified. Venetian apprenticeship therefore is a 
multifaceted institution, bent to the needs of professions and indi-
viduals, yet with remarkable stability through time.
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Appendix
OLS regression on Annual payment overall (1) and for the three sample peri-
ods (2), (3), (4). 
Dependent variable:
Average annual payment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Venetian 
(yes = 1)
-0.018
(0.202)
-0.262
(0.302)
-0.177
(0.359)
0.361
(0.380)
Year 0.013
***
(0.003)
0.008
(0.019)
-0.071
(0.067)
-0.114
(0.096)
Length of 
contract
-1.349***
(0.072)
-1.072***
(0.102)
-1.078***
(0.127)
-2.002***
(0.155)
Age of 
apprentice
0.307***
(0.037)
0.439***
(0.058)
0.255***
(0.057)
0.254***
(0.076)
Father 
(not alive = 1)
-0.046
(0.187)
-0.209
(0.279)
0.247
(0.305)
-0.152
(0.372)
Accommodation 
(paid by master = 1)
0.050
(0.641)
0.188
(1.212)
5.241***
(1.299)
-2.188**
(1.107)
Personal care 
(paid by master = 1)
-0.813**
(0.393)
-1.727
(1.403)
-2.832***
(0.966)
-0.580
(0.501)
Clothes (paid by 
master = 1)
-0.044
(0.207
-0.154
(0.325)
1.125**
(0.490)
-0.593
(0.370)
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Generic expenses 
(paid by master =1)
-1.286***
(0.579)
-0.465
(1.056)
-4.604***
(1.065)
0.577
(0.992)
Female guarantor 
(present = 1)
-0.393
(0.405)
-0.135
(0.559)
-0.405
(0.672)
-0.217
(0.951)
Periodization of 
payments (one final 
instalment = 1)
-3.328***
(0.334)
-6.790***
(0.675)
-1.648***
(0.429)
-3.133***
(0.643)
Incremental 
payments (yes = 1)
4.306***
(0.413)
4.350***
(0.573)
1.732**
(0.763)
5.684***
(0.870)
Constant 4.350
***
(0.573)
-1.273
(30.938)
124.713
(108.372)
205.320
(158.152)
Observations 2,760 1,212 721 827
R2 0.302 0.340 0.273 0.347
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.333 0.261 0.337
Residual Std. Error 4.488  (df = 2747)
4.510  
(df = 1199)
3.684  
(df = 708)
4.767  
(df = 814)
Note: *p**p***p<0.01
